外商投资企业如何应对新《公司法》项下的公司治理要求变化

How Should FIEs Respond to the Evolved Corporate Governance Rules under

the New PRC Company Law

作者：覃蓉，曹发平 

Authors: Rong Qin, Faping Cao

目录 / Table of contents

一、 公司治理组织机构概览

Ⅰ. Overview of the Organizational Structure

二、 股东会、董事会、经理和法定代表人的职权变化

Ⅱ. Change in the Scope of Powers of Shareholders Meeting, Board of Directors, General Manager and Legal Representative

三、 监督机构的设置要求变化

Ⅲ. Change of the Requirement regarding Supervisory Organ

四、 董监高的义务和责任的扩大

Ⅳ. Increased Obligations and Liability of Directors, Supervisors and Senior Management

五、 董事被解任的救济制度和董事责任保险

Ⅴ. Directors’ Remedy for Dismissal and the Director Liability Insurance

引言
最新于2023年12月29日修订的《公司法》（下称“新《公司法》”），已于2024年7月1日正式实施；同时，相关配套的行政法规《国务院关于实施〈中华人民共和国公司法〉注册资本登记管理制度的规定》亦于7月1日同时施行。另有《外商投资法》及相关实施条例于2020年1月1日施行，废止了原“三资企业法”，对所有外商投资企业适用《公司法》，并要求该法施行前已经成立的存量外商投资企业在2024年12月31日前调整公司治理结构使其与《公司法》一致；市场监督管理总局配套发布并同时生效的《关于贯彻落实

因此，对于外商投资企业而言，了解新《公司法》对于公司治理结构的要求并落实该等要求显得迫在眉睫。本文主要结合外商投资企业的需求，对新《公司法》在公司组织机构、股东及董事、监事、高级管理人员（合称“董监高”）的权责等方面提出的新要求作简要探讨。本文所讨论的外商投资企业仅限于有限责任公司，不包括外商投资合伙企业和外商投资股份有限公司。

The PRC Company Law amended on December 29, 2023 (the “New Company Law”) recently commenced its implementation on July 1, 2024, together with the State Council Provisions on Administration of Registered Capital Implementing the PRC Company Law. On the other hand, the Foreign Investment Law and its related implementation rules already took effect on January 1, 2020, which repealed the laws originally governing the three types of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and mandated universal application of the PRC Company Law to all FIEs including requiring the FIEs formed before December 31, 2024 (the “Existing FIEs”) to align their governance structure with the PRC Company Law. Along with such legislation, the State Administration of Market Regulation (SAMR) promulgated the Circular on Implementing the Foreign Investment Law and Administration of the Registrations and Filings of Foreign Invested Enterprises, effective also as of January 1, 2020, which required all Existing FIEs to amend their Articles of Association (AoA) and complete filings with SAMR local branch by December 31, 2024.

Therefore, it has become imperative for FIEs to familiarize themselves with, and further implement, the corporate governance rules under the New Company Law. This article will examine, from the FIEs’ perspective, the new requirements under the New Company Law in relation to corporate governance issues such as organizational structure, the powers and duties of the shareholders, directors, supervisors and senior management. “FIEs” as mentioned herein refers only to limited liability companies and does not include foreign invested partnerships or foreign invested companies limited by shares.

一、 公司治理组织机构概览

《外商投资企业法》施行之前，外商投资企业的组织机构主要表现形式为：

1、 外商独资企业按照原《公司法》设置股东会（或单一股东）、董事会（或一名执行董事）和监事会（或一至两名监事），其中股东会（或单一股东）为最高权力机构，董事会下一般又设总经理和其他管理人员，董事长、执行董事或经理为公司法定代表人；

2、 中外合资或中外合作经营企业按照相应的《中外合资经营企业法》或《中外合作经营企业法》设置组织架构，同时参照原《公司法》，一般来说，不设股东会，董事会是最高权力机构，董事由合资或合营双方委派（一方任董事长的，另一方任副董事长，另合作企业可不设董事会而设立管理委员会作为最高权力机构），同时设监事会（或一至两名监事）、总经理和副总经理（一方任命总经理、另一方任命副总经理）和其他管理人员，董事长担任法定代表人。

《外商投资企业法》施行之后，按照原《公司法》，所有外商投资企业都必须设立股东会（或单一股东）并作为最高权力机构，下设董事会（或一名执行董事）作为执行机构，董事会（或执行董事）下可以设经理，由董事会（或执行董事）决定聘任或解聘，公司的法定代表人可以是董事长、执行董事或经理。

与原《公司法》相比，新《公司法》在组织机构上进一步作了调整，主要包括股东会、董事会、经理和法定代表人的职权，以及监督机构的设置要求,详见下述第二部分和第三部分。为方便讨论，下面所提到的股东会包括单一股东的情形，董事会包括独任董事（原《公司法》项下称“执行董事”，新《公司法》删除了这一称谓）的情形。

Ⅰ. Overview of the Organizational Structure

In the era before the Foreign Investment Law, FIEs were typically organized as follows: 

1.  A “wholly-owned foreign enterprise” or WFOE, following the old PRC Company Law, would have a shareholders meeting (or a single shareholder), a board of directors (or a single executive director), a supervisory board (or one or two supervisors), and usually also have a general manager and other management personnel under the board of directors (or the executive director). The shareholders’ meeting (or the single shareholder) was the highest decision-making body of a WFOE, while the legal representative could be either the chairman of the board, the executive director or the general manager; or 

2.  “Sino-foreign equity joint ventures” (EJV) or “Sino-foreign cooperative joint ventures” (CJV, together with EJV, the “JV”) were organized respectively in accordance with the EJV Law or CJV Law, by making only partial reference to the old PRC Company Law, and did not have any shareholders meeting. Instead, a board of directors (or sometimes the joint management committee for a CJV) served as the highest decision-making body of the company.  The directors were appointed by the JV partners (if one JV partner appointed the chairman of the board, the other JV partner would appoint the vice chairman). A JV would also have a supervisory board (or one or two supervisors), a general manager and a vice general manger (with each appointed by a JV partner respectively) and, if necessary, other management personnel. A JV’s legal representative must be its chairman of the board.

Since the effectiveness of the Foreign Investment Law, all FIEs have been required to comply with the old PRC Company Law by designating the shareholders meeting (or the single shareholder) as the highest authority of company organ, with a board of directors (or a single executive director) working under the shareholders’ meeting as the executive organ. There may be a general manager under the board of directors (or the executive director), which the board (or the executive director) may appoint or remove. A FIE can have its chairman of the board, executive director or general manager serve as the legal representative.

Compared with the old PRC Company Law, the New Company Law further adjusts the organization structure of a company, including the scope of powers and authority for shareholders meeting, board of directors, general manager and legal representative, as well as the requirement and permissible forms of the supervisory organ, which will be discussed in details in below Sections II and III respectively. For the convenience of our discussion, the term “shareholders meeting” when referenced herein below encompasses the single shareholder, and the “board of directors” encompasses the sole director (equivalent to the term “executive director” coined under the old PRC Company Law, which term is abandoned by the New Company Law).

二、股东会、董事会、经理和法定代表人的职权变化

过往实践中，外资企业可以根据其需要通过章程对股东会、董事会和经理的职权作出划分，但要遵守《公司法》的强制性规定并参照其缺省性规定。法定代表人一般被认为全权代表公司，但章程可对其职权进行限制。基于这一实践，新《公司法》的以下变化需要注意。

首先，与原《公司法》相比，新《公司法》总体来看扩大了董事会的职权，具体表现为：

1、 限缩了股东会的职权，包括：一方面，新《公司法》将“决定公司的经营方针和投资计划”与“审议批准公司的年度财务预算、决算方案”从股东会的职权范围内删除，并将前者归入董事会的职权；另一方面，董事会的职权范围中“制定公司的年度财务预算、决算方案”一项删除（新《公司法》第59条和67条）。这意味着董事会对于公司经营方针和投资计划具有决定权；而至于年度财务预算、决算，是否还需要制定或审批、以及谁来制定、谁来审批，公司自由作出选择，如果公司章程没有约定，则可由股东会、董事会自行决定。

2、 董事会职权的兜底项在“公司章程规定的其他职权”基础上增加了“股东会授予的其他职权”，另外，明确规定了股东会可以授权董事会对发行债券作出决议（新《公司法》第59和67条）。这意味着董事会的职权不再局限于章程所明文列举的范围，即使在章程没有明确约定的情形下，股东会也可以将处理、决定各种事项的权限授予董事会行使。

3、 删除了经理的职权列举项，改为笼统地规定由公司的章程规定或者董事会授权（新《公司法》第74条）。这意味着原《公司法》项下规定的诸多经理职权事项，包括主持公司的生产经营管理工作、组织实施公司年度经营计划和投资方案、拟定公司内部管理机构设置方案、拟定公司基本管理制度、制定公司具体规章、提请聘任或解聘公司的副经理、财务负责人、决定聘任或解聘其他管理人员，都可以由公司章程或董事会决定而收归为董事会职权或授权经理或其他管理人员行使。

4、 在维护公司资本充实、公司清算、利冲豁免审批等方面赋予了董事会更多实质性的职权，包括：(a)股东逾期不缴纳出资且经催缴后在不少于60天的宽限期满仍不履行出资义务的，董事会可以作出决议向该股东发出失权通知，没收其股权（新《公司法》第52条）；(b)原《公司法》规定公司清算组由股东组成，新《公司法》改为董事作为清算义务人，清算组由董事组成（公司章程或股东会决议另选他人的除外）（新《公司法》第232条）；及(c)董监高涉及与公司的利益冲突交易、或谋取公司商业机会或同业竞争时需要报告并获得公司权力机构批准，该机构既可以是股东会也可以是董事会（非关联董事不足三人的情形除外），具体由章程规定（新《公司法》第182-185条）。

5、 新增规定了公司合并交易中，以下两种情形无需股东会决议，董事会决议即可：(a) 如果被合并的公司与持有其股份90%以上的股东公司合并，被合并的公司不需要经股东会决议；(b)如果合并中支付价款的一方所支付的价款不超过本公司净资产的10%，该方也无需经股东会决议（以下称“简易合并”）（新《公司法》第219条）。

基于上述，在新《公司法》下，除了选举更换董事、监事，决定董事、监事的报酬事项，审议批准董事会或监事会的报告，审议批准公司的利润分配和弥补亏损方案，决定公司增资减资，决定公司合并（非简易合并）、分立、解散、清算或变更公司形式，修订章程，批准公司为公司股东或实际控制人提供担保（合称“法定股东会保留事项”）之外，其他与公司有关的事项的决定权都可由董事会行使，所以有评论称新《公司法》确立了“董事会中心主义”。

但这一原则并非强制性，公司仍然可以视其具体需求通过章程规定为股东会和/或经理保留更大的职权范围，或在章程之外通过董事会授权的方式将一些事项交给经理决定。值得注意的是，新《公司法》规定的董事会职权的列举事项，诸如召集股东会，执行股东会决议，决定公司经营计划和投资方案，制定公司利润分配方案和弥补亏损方案，制定公司的增资或减资方案或发行债券方案，制定公司合并，分立，解散或变更公司形式的方案，决定公司内部管理机构的设置，决定聘任或解聘公司经理及其报酬事项，并根据经理的提名决定聘任或解聘公司副经理，财务负责人及其报酬事项，制定公司基本管理制度，是否能通过章程上升为股东会决议事项或通过授权下放为经理权限，新《公司法》与原《公司法》一样并未作出明确规定。

虽然通常法无明文禁止应为允许，但我们认为在这一点上，要视具体情形而定，例如召集股东会的权利，新《公司法》沿袭原《公司法》规定董事会不履职或不能履职时，由监事会和持有1/10表决权以上的股东依次序行使召集权(第63条)，因此该权利既不能由股东会保留、也不宜下放给经理。

其次，新《公司法》首次明确规定了公司章程对董事会职权的限制不得对抗善意第三人，这意味着法律不再要求第三人在和公司交易之前先去调查董事会的权限再确认董事会批准交易的决议是否有效。除了法定股东会保留事项之外，董事会在其他事项上被假定为具有全权代表公司作出决定或行为的能力。因此，虽然公司可以通过章程将法定股东会保留事项之外的某些重大事项的决策权补充规定为需要股东会决议的事项，该等规定可能并不能有效防止董事会的越权行为。

再次，对于法定代表人的人选，原《公司法》要求除了经理之外必须是董事长，新《公司法》允许是经理或者任何“执行公司事务”的董事，保留了更大的灵活性（第10条）。和董事会类似，新《公司法》也强化了法定代表人的职权：一方面，公司章程或股东会对法定代表人职权的限制，也不得对抗善意第三人；另一方面，明文规定法定代表人以公司名义从事的民事活动法律后果由公司承担，法定代表人因执行职务造成他人损害的，先由公司承担民事责任（第11条）。值得注意的是，这里民事活动的范围没有任何限制，因此，理论上法定代表人可以代表公司作出任何交易或其他民事行为，无论该行为是否违法或违反章程或董事会或股东会决定，该等交易和行为的后果都将约束公司并由公司承担后果和责任，而且公司不再能通过章程防范该等情形。

综上，随着新《公司法》下董事会和法定代表人职权的扩张，外资企业的股东在任命董事和法定代表人时应更为谨慎，并通过加强的内控机制对其履职行为进行监督，防止出现失控的董事会和法定代表人。

Ⅱ. Change in the Scope of Powers of Shareholders Meeting, Board of Directors, General Manager and Legal Representative

It has been recognized in the past practice that a FIE may divide the company management and decision powers among shareholders meeting, board of directors and general manager to the extent consistent with the mandatory rules, while making appropriate reference to the default rules, under the PRC Company Law. While the legal representative usually has full power and authority to act on behalf of a FIE, such authority may be limited by the AoA. Based on such practice, the following developments under the New Company Law shall be noted.

First of all, the New Company Law has generally expanded the scope of powers for the board of directors by:

1.  reducing the powers of the shareholders meeting, including (a) removing from it “deciding the company’s operation and investment plans” and “reviewing and approving the company’s annual financial budget and reconciliation plan”, while moving the former item to the scope of powers of the board of directors; and (b) deleting “preparing the company’s annual financial budget and reconciliation plan” from the board of director’s scope of authority (Art. 59 and 67 of the New Company Law). As a result, the board of directors will have the power to determine the company’s “management policy and investment plans”; and companies will have more flexibility regarding whether to have a financial budget and reconciliation plan formally prepared and reviewed every year, and if yes, by which company organ- all can be stated in the AoA, or decided by its shareholders meeting or the board of directors.

2.  adding the phrase “or as otherwise authorized by the shareholders meeting” to the wording “other powers provided by the company’s AoA” as the catch-all item in the enumerated list of the powers of board of directors, and also explicitly stating the shareholders meeting may authorize the board of directors to approve the issuance of any corporate bonds (Art. 59 and 67 of the New Company Law). This would make it possible for the shareholders meeting to further delegate various matters to the board of directors outside the enumerated items explicitly stated in the company’s AoA.

3.  completely removing the enumerated list of the general manager’s scope of powers and instead leave such matter entirely to be defined by the AoA or authorized by the board of directors. Consequentially, all such matters that used to be identified under the old PRC Company Law as within the powers and authorities of the general manager, such as “directing the production, operational and managerial affairs of the company, coordinating for implementation of the company’s annual operation and investment plan, proposing the management structure, formulating the company’s management regulations and specific rules, proposing the appointment or dismissal of the vice general manager and financial chief, and deciding the appointment or dismissal of other management personnel”, now may be elevated as the matters requiring resolutions by the board of directors, reserved for the general manager or delegated to other management personnel.

4.  giving the board of directors substantial power in areas such as securing adequate capitalization of the company, liquidation and approval of conflicted interest transactions and similar issues, namely: (a) the board is empowered to give a “forfeiture notice” to a shareholder whose contribution of subscribed registered capital amount is overdue and who fails to make such contribution after expiry of the grace period (not less than 60 days) upon receiving the notice from the company demanding it to make the contribution, which would result in cancellation of such shareholder’s proportional equity ownership in the company (Art. 52 of the New Company Law); (b) while the old PRC Company Law required a company’s shareholders to serve as members of its liquidation committee, the New Company Law holds all directors as the responsible party for conducting liquidation and requires the liquidation committee to be staffed with directors (unless the company’s AoA or the shareholders meeting elects other persons) (Art. 232 of the New Company Law); and (c) when a director, supervisor or senior management plans to enter into a conflicted interest transaction, take a business opportunity that may belong to the company, or engage in any business in the same line as the company’s business, he or she shall report to the company and seek approval; which approval under the New Company Law could be granted by either the shareholder meeting, or, the board of directors (unless the number of disinterested directors is less than three) as provided by the company’s AoA (Art. 182-185 of the New Company Law).

5.  Requiring board of directors’ resolution instead of shareholders meeting’s approval in a merger transaction that satisfies either of the following standards: (a) for the merged company, if it’s merged into its shareholder that holds more than 90% of its equity ownership; or (b) for the merging company, if the consideration it pays for such merger is less than 10% of its net asset value (collectively, the “Short-form Merger”) (Art. 219 of the New Company Law).

Based on the above, the New Company Law allows all company decisions to be made by the board of directors, except the following: appointing, replacing, removing, and deciding the remuneration of, directors/supervisors, reviewing and approving the reports made by the board of directors or board of supervisors, reviewing and approving the plan for profit distribution and loss recovery, deciding the increase or decrease or registered capital, approving mergers (other than a Short-form Merger)/division/dissolution/liquidation/change of company form, amending the company’s AoA, and approving any guarantee provided by the company for any of its shareholder(s) or “actual controlling person(s)”  (collectively, the “Statutorily Reserved Shareholder Meeting Matters”). Hence, some commentators claim that the New Company Law sanctions a corporate governance structure centralized on the board of the directors.

However, such rule is by default rather than mandatory. A company, if needed, may still allocate additional powers to its shareholders meeting and/or the general manager by providing such in the AoA. Its board of directors may also delegate certain powers and authorities to the general manager outside the scope of the AoA. The New Company Law still has an inexhaustive enumerated list for board of directors action items including: convening shareholders meeting, implementing shareholders meeting’s decisions, deciding the company’s operation and investment plans, preparing the company’s profit distribution and loss recovery plans, preparing the plan for increase/decrease of registered capital or issuance of corporate bonds, preparing the plan for mergers/division/dissolution/change of company form, deciding the management structure, deciding the appointment/removal/remuneration of the general manager, and deciding the appointment/removal/renumeration of the vice general manager and financial chief based on the general manager’s proposal, as well as formulating the company’s management regulations. Notably, it’s uncertain whether these items can be elevated as matters for resolution by shareholders meeting by provision of a company’s AoA or delegated to the general manger by authorization of the board of directors. Like its predecessor, the New Company Law is silent on this issue.

Despite the general rule that what is not prohibited should be allowed, we believe this may not be the case for such matter. For example, with respect to convening of shareholders meeting, the New Company Law and its predecessor expressly states that such duty if not performed by the board of directors, should be taken on, in sequential order, by the board of supervisors or a shareholder holding more than 10% equity ownership (Art. 63 of the New Company Law), which would render it unfit to be either reserved for shareholders or delegated to the general manager.

Secondly, the New Company Law for the first time explicitly states that the limitations imposed in the AoA on the powers and authorities of the board of directors will have no force or effect vis-à-vis a bona fide third party. The law thus no longer requires a third party, before dealing with a company, to investigate into the board of directors’ scope of authority to further determine whether the board of directors’ approval of such transaction is valid. Consequentially, the board of directors has obtained full presumed authority by law to act or make decisions on behalf of a company on all matters except for the Statutorily Reserved Shareholders Meeting Matters. With respect to an issue outside the Statutorily Reserved Shareholders Meeting Matters, even if it is so material that the AoA require it to be resolved by the shareholders, such requirement can not prevent the board of directors from acting on it and binding the company.

Thirdly, in contrast with the old PRC Company Law that required the position of legal representative to be held either by the general manager or chairman of the board, the New Company Law permits candidates to be, in addition to the general manager, any director “executing the company affairs”, which allows more flexibility in this regard (Art. 10 of the New Company Law). Similar with the board of directors, the authority of the legal representative is enhanced under the New Company Law. On the one hand, any limitation of the legal representative’s authority in the AoA or otherwise established by the shareholders meeting would be invalid vis-a-visa a bona fide third party. On the other hand, the law expressly states that the any “civil law acts” done by the legal representative in the company’s name would be deemed the company’s act with consequences borne by the company and the company will be held liable if the legal representative when acting in such capacity injures any third party (Art. 11 of the New Company Law). Notably, there are no limitations on such “civil law acts” and therefore the legal representative may enter into any transaction on behalf of the company with legal effect and consequences assumed by the company, regardless whether such transaction is illegal or violates the AoA or any resolution of the board of directors or shareholders’ meeting. The company can longer avert such undesired consequence by any provision in the AoA.

In summary, given the above expansion of powers and authority for board of directors and legal representative under the New Company Law, a FIE’s shareholder(s) should be more cautious when appointing directors and legal representative. It would be equally important to establish and maintain a reasonably secure internal control system that will enable shareholder(s) exercising ongoing monitoring and oversight of the performance of duties by directors and legal representative, in order to avoid a most disastrous situation with runaway directors and legal representative.

三、监督机构的设置要求变化

相比原《公司法》不论公司规模和性质一律要求设立监事会（或一到两名监事）的规定，新《公司法》在监督机构的设置方面上提供了较大灵活性：

首先，新《公司法》项下，监督机构的形式有两种选项：一种是监事会（在规模较小或股东人数较少的情形下，可以不设监事会，而设一名监事）；另一种是不设监事会或监事，而设审计委员会，由董事组成，行使监事会职权（新《公司法》第69条）。

其次，规模较小或股东人数较少的情形下，公司还可以既不设监事会或监事，也不设董事会，但前提是全体股东一致同意（新《公司法》第83条）。“规模较小或者股东人数较少”的具体标准是什么，尚需观察市场监督管理部门在公司登记备案过程中的实践操作情况，以进一步明确，但只有一个股东的外商独资企业很可能会符合该标准。

对于是否保留监督机构的设置，如是，设立监事会/监事还是设置审计委员会，根据每一家外资企业的实际情况可能会有不同考量，我们在此提出以下建议谨供参考：

1、 理论上，监督机构具有监督董事会和高级管理人员的职能，有权检查公司财务、对董事和高级管理人员损害公司利益的行为有权要求纠正和提起诉讼、对违法律、行政法规、公司章程或股东会决议的董事、高级管理人员提出解任的建议，并有权提请（并在董事会不履行职责时候代为召集和主持）及股东会会议。新《公司法》下进一步新增“可以要求董事、高级管理人员提交执行职务的报告”的职权（第80条）。这些职能，如果得到充分行使，有助于预防、发现、纠正和追索董事和高级管理人员的违法或不当行为，保护公司和股东利益。

2、 实践操作中，监事会的监督职能很容易流于形式。尤其是一些外资企业的监事为外籍人员，往往常驻海外，对企业的情况和相关中国法律都不够了解，使得他们难以有效、及时地履行职责。

3、 新《公司法》下监事的职权没有大的变化，但监事的履职义务和责任要求大幅增加（见本文第四部分）。

4、 在外资企业为多名股东的情形下（包括合资企业），如果一方是控股股东并控制董事会和大多数高级管理人员的任免权，则对其他股东而言，为保护其小股东利益，比较好的办法仍然是要求设立监督机构，并争取该等监督机构成员的任免权，以平衡和制约大股东对公司控制。

5、 对于只有一名股东的外商独资企业，如果股东能有效地控制董事会并通过董事会保留对公司特定重大事项的决策权以及经理和其他高级管理人员的任命权，来监督和指导高管对公司的日常运营，对其进行有效的控制和制约，一般不需要再另设单独的监督机构。

6、 新《公司法》创设的审计委员会由于隶属于董事会，由董事组成，由于人事的重合，如何内部协调董事会的执行职能和审计委员会的监督职能将成为实践中的难点。

Ⅲ. Change of the Requirement regarding Supervisory Organ

The old PRC Company Law requires a company to appoint a board of supervisors (or one or two supervisor(s)) regardless the nature or size of the company. The New Company Law liberalizes this rule to certain extent, specifically as follows:

First, there are two forms of supervisory organ available under the New Company Law: one is the supervisory board (or a single supervisor, when the company is small and has a small number of shareholders), the other being an audit committee in lieu of the supervisory board  with directors serving as committee members and exercising the powers and authorities of the supervisory board (Art. 69 of the New Company Law).

Second, when the company is small and has a small number of shareholders, it may even opt for not having any supervisory organ (i.e., neither the supervisory board/supervisor nor the audit committee need to be created), as long as all its shareholder(s) agree so (Art. 83 of the New Company Law). What the measurable standards would be for qualifying as “small company with a small number of shareholders” remains to be seen based on the future company registration and filing practice of SAMR. We are of the view that a WFOE with only one shareholder very likely qualifies.

Each FIE may have its own considerations when it comes to the question whether to keep a supervisory organ, and if yes, whether it should be a supervisory board (a single supervisor) or an audit committee, and the answer may vary case by case. Nonetheless, the following may be worth noting when making such decision:

1.  Theoretically, the supervisor organ performs an important function of supervising the board of directors and senior management and is empowered to inspect the company’s financial affairs, demand corrections of and bring lawsuits against the actions of directors and senior management that harms the company, propose removal of directors or senior management that violated any law/regulation/AoA/resolution of shareholders meeting. The New Company Law further adds “the right to request directors and senior management to submit working reports” (Art. 80). All such powers, if fully exercised, would substantially contribute to preventing, uncovering, remediating and claiming against the m breach of duty or misconduct of directors and senior management, and will better protect the company’s and shareholders’ interest.

2.  In reality, however, the oversight role of the supervisory organ may work only on paper. This is particularly true when the supervisor(s) of some FIEs are foreign nationals, who are primarily based outside China and only have limited knowledge of Chinese law and the company’s specifics, which makes it difficult for them to promptly and effectively discharge their duties.

3.  Under the New Company Law, there is no material change to the scope of powers for supervisor(s) but their obligations and potential liability have substantially increased (see further discussions in Section IV below).

4.  When a FIE has multiple shareholders (including in particular the JVs), if a shareholder holds majority of the equity ownership and controls the approval/removal of a majority of the board of directors and/or senior management, the other shareholder(s) will benefit from the forming of a supervisory organ with the members of such organ appointed by the non-controlling shareholder(s),  as a counterbalance to the powers of the controlling shareholder.

5.  In the case of a WFOE with a single shareholder, if the shareholder can retain effective control of the board of directors, and supervise and rein in the managers as well as the daily management and operation of the company through the board of directors by keeping major decisions (including the appointment and removal of senior management) at the board of directors’ level, a separate supervisory organ may not be necessary.

6.  The audit committee, as a new instrumentality created by the New Company Law, is formed and will operate within, the board of directors. There will be an inevitable overlap of constitution of these two organs. Therefore, it might be difficult to coordinate the executive function of the board with the supervisory role of the audit committee, all to be seen how it will play out in practice.

四、董监高的义务和责任的扩大

新《公司法》此次修订的一大重点为扩大董事在维护公司资本充实和公司清算方面的义务，强化董事、监事、高级管理人员应尽的忠实、勤勉义务以及对公司、对第三方的赔偿责任，主要包含以下内容：

1、 董监高的忠实义务在原《公司法》项下采取不完全举例方式规定，勤勉义务仅作为概念提出而未明确具体内容。新《公司法》首次对这两个概念的内涵进行了定义，忠实义务为“应当采取措施避免自身利益与公司利益冲突，不得利用职权谋取不正当利益”，勤勉义务为“执行职务应当为公司的最大利益尽到管理者通常应有的合理注意”（新《公司法》第180条）。

2、 原《公司法》对利冲交易的规定比较简单，新《公司法》规定了更详细的报告义务和批准程序，并将利益冲突的情形从直接利冲扩展到了间接利冲，将董监高的近亲属、董监高或其近亲属直接或者间接控制的企业、其他关联人与公司订立合同或交易的情形也纳入了利冲监管的范畴（新《公司法》第182条）。

3、 原《公司法》对谋取公司商业机会和同业竞争的规定也比较简单，新《公司法》下规定了更详细的报告义务和批准程序（新《公司法》第183和184条）。

4、 关于利冲交易、谋取公司商业机会和同业竞争的限制以及对其他违反忠实义务的行为（例如挪用资金、将公司资金以个人名义开户存储、接受他人与公司交易的佣金归为己有、擅自披露公司秘密）的禁止，原《公司法》项下仅适用于董事和高管，新《公司法》下延伸到了监事（新《公司法》第182-184条）。

5、 新《公司法》还将忠实和勤勉义务首次扩大适用到实际执行公司事务的控股股东和实际控制人，并要求指示董事、高管从事损害公司或股东利益的行为的控股股东和实际控制人与该等董事和高管承担连带责任（新《公司法》第180条和第192条）。

6、 新《公司法》首次规定了董事和高管执行职务给他人造成损害并存在故意或重大过失的，应当与公司一起对第三人承担责任（但此处的赔偿责任未明确是连带责任还是补充责任）（新《公司法》第191条）。

7、 新《公司法》首次规定了董事会对股东出资的核查和催缴义务，并规定未及时履行该义务，给公司造成损失的，负有责任的董事应当承担赔偿责任；另外，负有责任的董监高对股东抽逃出资也需要承担连带赔偿责任（新《公司法》第51条和53条）。

8、 新《公司法》首次规定了股东违法分配利润给公司造成损失的，股东及负有责任的董监高都要承担赔偿责任（但此处董监高的赔偿责任亦未明确是连带责任还是补充责任）（新《公司法》第211条）。

9、 新《公司法》明确规定董事为公司清算义务人，应当在解散事由出现之日起十五日内组成清算组进行清算，并规定清算义务人未及时履行清算义务，给公司或者债权人造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任（新《公司法》第232条）。

以上规定必然带来董监高履职责任的扩大。在外资公司中部分董监高，尤其是隶属于外资公司总部、长驻境外的人员，由于受到办公所在地、出入境不便等客观因素的限制，未实质性参与公司的经营和决策的情形并不鲜见，另外，该等人员在外资股东所属企业集团中的其他实体兼职的情形也很常见,而该等实体很有可能经营着和外资企业同类或类似的业务。随着新《公司法》下忠实和勤勉义务的进一步充实和明晰，建议未来针对这一情况予以改善，由熟悉公司的业务情况、深度参与业务实际运营的人士担任董监高，并将总部人员与外资企业人员适当区分，在某些人员必须兼职的情况下履行正式的报告和批准流程，以降低外方股东委派的董监高因违反新《公司法》项下的忠实、勤勉和其他义务而承担个人责任的风险。

与上述董事高的责任扩大化对比，新《公司法》对法定代表人的履职责任规定相对宽松，法定代表人仅在执行职务造成他人损害且存在过错的前提下，且在公司承担民事责任之后依法律或章程规定向其提起追偿主张的情形下，向公司承担个人责任（新《公司法》第11条）。但应注意到，因为法定代表人同时又是董事或者经理，上述关于董监高义务和责任的分析也适用于法定代表人。

Ⅳ. Increased Obligations and Liability of Directors, Supervisors and Senior Management

Another highlight of the New Company Law is the increased obligations of directors in securing adequate capitalization of the company and in company liquidation, the enhanced fiduciary duty of the directors/supervisors/senior management, and their potential liability against the company and third parties. The details are as follows:

1.  Under the old PRC Company Law, the concept of “duty of loyalty” for directors, supervisors and senior management was substantiated with an inexhaustive list of examples, while “duty of care” was mentioned as a concept only and without any substance. For the first time, the New Company Law has defined these two terms, with “duty of loyalty” meaning directors, supervisors and senior management “shall take precautions to avoid any conflict of interest with the company and shall not obtain any improper benefit relating to their official capacity”, and “duty of care” being defined as “performing their duties in a manner that maximizing the company’s benefit with reasonable degree of care that are normally expected of such a manager” (Art. 180 of the New Company Law).

2.  The rule governing conflicted interest transactions under the old PRC Company Law was over simplified and under-inclusive. The New Company Law improves the process requirements of reporting and approval, and expands the coverage from direct conflict of interest to indirect conflict of interest by subjecting to regulation the transactions with company made by any close relative of a director/supervisor/senior management, or an entity directly or indirectly controlled by a director/supervisor/senior management or any of his/her close relative, or any other related person of a director/supervisor/senior management (Art. 182 of the New Company Law).

3.  Similarly, the rules restricting the directors and senior management from taking opportunity that may belong to the company or conducting business competing with the company were inadequate under the old PRC Company Law. The New Company Law tightens them up. (Art. 183 and 184 of the New Company Law).

4.  Under the old PRC Company Law, the restriction on conflicted interest transactions, corporate opportunity and competition with company (as mentioned in above para. 2 and 3), as well as the prohibition on certain other breach of “duty of loyalty” (such as embezzlement of company funds, depositing company funds in personal bank accounts, receiving commission in transactions between company and third parties, and unauthorized disclosure of company secrets) used to apply only to directors and senior management but not supervisors. The New Company Law has expressly extended such rules to supervisors (Art. 182-184 of the New Company Law).

5.  The New Company Law for the first time imposes the “duty of loyalty” and “duty of care” on such “controlling shareholder(s)” and “actual controlling person(s)” that actually execute company affairs. Moreover, “controlling shareholder(s)” and “actual controlling person(s)” who direct company directors or senior management to engage in activities that harm the company or other shareholders will be held jointly and severally liable with such directors and senior management. (Art. 180 and 192 of the New Company Law).

6.  The New Company Law also for the first time explicitly holds directors and senior management personally liable to a third party who is injured by such directors or senior management when they act in official capacity with intentional misconduct or gross negligence (though, as the company will also be liable, it’s not entirely clear whether such director or senior management will be held jointly and severally liability together with the company, or they will only have secondary liability) (Art. 191 of the New Company Law).

7.  The New Company Law for the first time imposes on the board of directors an obligation to verify the shareholder’s capital contribution and demand the shareholders to make such contribution. It further provides that if the directors default on this obligation and the company suffers losses therefrom, the defaulting directors shall indemnify such losses. Similarly, if a shareholder illegally takes back any amount of his/her contributed capital, the “responsible” director(s)/supervisor(s)/senior management will be held jointly and severally liable with such shareholder (Art. 51 and 53 of the New Company Law).

8.  The New Company Law for the first time expressly states that if there is any profit distribution in violation of the law and causing injury to the company, both the shareholder(s) that made such distribution and the “responsible” director(s)/supervisor(s)/senior management will be liable (again, it’s not entirely clear whether such director(s)/supervisor(s)/senior management will have joint and several liability or only secondary liability) (Art. 211 of the New Company Law).

9.  The New Company Law identifies a company’s directors as the responsible parties for conducting company liquidation, and requires the company to form a liquidation committee within 15 days following the occurrence of the event or circumstance resulting in the company’s dissolution. If the directors fail to discharge the relevant obligations in the liquidation process and the company or its creditors suffers any loss therefrom, the directors will be held personally liable (Art. 232 of the New Company Law).

The above changes have substantially increased potential liability of directors, supervisors and senior management associated with their official roles. In FIEs, it’s common that some directors, supervisors and senior management, especially those affiliated with the overseas headquarter or based overseas, may not actually participant in day-to-day management and decision-making, due to the far-away location and inconvenience of traveling across borders. It’s also very common that such persons usually hold concurrent positions in one or more other entities within the corporate group, which are in the same or similar line of business as the FIE. As the New Company Law has further clarified and tightened the rules relating to the “duty of loyalty” and “duty of care” for directors, supervisors and senior management, it would be advisable for the FIEs’ shareholder(s) to appoint to such positions persons who can actually get involved in the company’s management and operations, and if possible, to separate them from other roles within the same corporate group. If such separation is not possible and some directors or officers must hold concurrent positions, precautions must be taken to carefully follow and document the disclosure and approval procedures so as to reduce the risk of violating the “duty of loyalty”, “duty of care” or other statutory obligations under the New Company Law.

In contrast with the expansion of liabilities for directors, supervisors and senior management, the New Company Law is lax on potential personal liability for legal representatives. Such liability will attach only when the legal representative’s acts in official capacity are with fault and have injured a third party and only when the company, after discharging the resulting liability with such third party, makes a recourse claim against the legal representative (Art. 11 of the New Company Law). Nonetheless, since a company’s legal representative will also be its director or general manager, the above legal analysis regarding the obligations and liability of directors, supervisors and senior management also applies to the legal representative.  

五、董事被解任的救济制度和董事责任保险

在强化董监高权责的情况下，作为平衡，新《公司法》首次在法律层面引入了董事解任救济制度和董事责任保险条款。

根据新《公司法》第71条，股东会无正当理由在任期届满前解任董事的，该董事可以要求公司予以赔偿。长期以来，实践中普遍的共识均是股东方可以任意、无理由、无责任地解任其提名的董事，这一认知在新《公司法》下将受到挑战。

对外资企业而言，无论是独资公司或是合资公司，未来在提前解任董事时均需妥善考虑是否系出于合理事由，，若无合理事由，虽然仍然可以解任但却可能需要支付赔偿。究竟哪些事由可作为“正当理由”，法律尚未界定，容易成为争议点。因此，从实务的角度，在任命董事时最好规定合理的任期，在解任董事时应考虑与董事书面确认其与公司之间不存在任何未决的纠纷或赔偿争议，避免董事在被解任后提出赔偿要求。

新《公司法》第193条规定，公司可以在董事任职期间为董事因执行公司职务承担的赔偿责任投保责任保险。公司为董事投保责任保险或者续保后，董事会应当向股东会报告责任保险的投保金额、承保范围及保险费率等内容。

这一条所明确提及的投保对象仅包括董事，并未包括监事和高级管理人员，但也并未禁止监事和高级管理人员投保。另外，保险所覆盖的履职行为是否允许包括董事违反法律、行政法规或章程规定或违反忠实义务的情形，也有待实践检验。

虽然购买此类保险并非公司义务，但在董监高履职风险提升的背景下，董监高可能会向公司提出购买此类保险的要求。如果一方股东对公司的实际运营没有完全的控制权，该方任命的董监高可能对此类保险的需求会更为迫切，比如在中方控股的合资公司中外方任命的董监高。但中国的保险行业在职业责任险领域尚处于早期，目前市场上存在的保险产品主要针对上市公司的董事和高管，是否有适合外资企业且承保范围和费率合适的险种尚不明确。建议有需求的客户尽早向保险公司咨询。

Ⅴ. Directors’ Remedy for Dismissal and the Director Liability Insurance

As a counterbalance to the expanded obligations and liability of directors, supervisors and senior management, the New Company Law for the first time includes into the law directors’ remedy for dismissal and director liability insurance.

In accordance with Art. 71 of the New Company Law, a director may demand compensation from the company if dismissed by shareholders meeting before expiry of office term and without “due course”. There was a common understanding in practice for a long time that shareholders may dismiss a director they appointed at any time, for any reason, without any liability. Such understanding will be challenged by the New Company Law.

Going forward, the shareholders of a FIE (whether a WFOE or JV) when planning to dismiss a director, shall evaluate if there is underlying reasons that may justify as “due course”. In the absence of such “due course”, the shareholders may still dismiss such director but may need to make a compensation payment. Since the term “due course” is undefined and prone for controversy, as a matter of practice, it would be advisable to specify a reasonable term of office when the shareholders appoint a director in the first place. In the case of an early dismissal, in order to avoid any future claim for dismissal without “due course”, it would be desirable for the company to obtain a written release from the dismissed director stating no  disputes or compensation controversy outstanding between the company and such director.

Art. 193 of the New Company Law provides that a company may procure liability insurance against the directors’ liability resulting from their acts in official capacity, and that the board of directors shall report the insured value, insurance coverage and premium amount of such insurance to the shareholders meeting.

Although the above provision only refers to insurance covering liability of directors but not of senior management and supervisors, it does not explicitly prohibit such insurance either. It remains to be seen if the covered liability would be allowed to include the situation where the insured director has violated law, regulations or the company’s AoA or breached the “duty of loyalty”.

Despite that companies are not legally obliged to purchase or maintain such liability insurance, directors, supervisors and senior management may very likely request it given the fact that their liability exposure has increased substantially under the New Company Law. The need to shield liability would be especially acute in a multiple-shareholder FIE for the director(s), supervisor(s) and senior management that were appointed or nominated by the minority shareholder, such as the foreign JV partner’s appointees and nominees in a JV where the Chinese JV partner dominates. However, the Chinese insurance industry is still in its early stage in the field of professional liability insurance, with currently available products on Chinese market apply primarily to directors and senior officers of Chinese listed companies. It’s uncertain whether there will be similar insurance available to FIEs at reasonable rate and with proper coverage. FIEs with need should make early inquiries with insurers.

结语

本次新《公司法》给公司治理带来较大变化，外商投资企业应在2024年12月31日之前修订章程使其与新《公司法》一致，另外需综合多方面因素考虑如何在新《公司法》的框架下设置满足自身需求、符合股东方原来预期效果的公司治理结构，并对新《公司法》提出的新挑战比如董监高大幅增加的履职义务和风险采取合适的应对措施。

Conclusion

The New Company Law has made an overhaul to corporate governance rules. FIEs should amend their AoA accordingly before December 31, 2024. It is recommended that FIEs evaluate all relevant considerations and a corporate governance structure that not only complies with the New Company Law but also are aligned with the original intent and needs of the company and its shareholders. The FIEs also should take proper measures to address the new challenges imposed by the New Company Law such as the substantially increased obligations and liability for directors, supervisors and senior management.

覃 蓉

融孚律师事务所 高级法律顾问

覃蓉女士毕业于复旦大学与芝加哥大学法学院，在加入融孚所之前，曾在一家美国律所上海代表处有12年的工作经验，另外曾担任过一家德国律师事务所上海代表处的本地合伙人。覃蓉女士在公司法律事务、跨境并购、外商直接投资、公司合规业务等领域有多年从业经验，为多家美国财富500强企业在中国的投资和并购，以及中国公司境外投资和境外资本市场融资提供法律服务。所服务的客户包括一家知名德国奢侈箱包品牌、一家知名德国汽车零部件公司、德国输电设备制造商、多家美国财富500强的化工企业、农业企业、保险公司、机械和电子原件企业、特殊材料制造企业等知名企业。在过去10多年的执业过程中，覃蓉女士积累了丰富的实务经验，熟悉本地实践，擅长跟踪法律的发展变化以及在法律规定尚不完全清楚的领域给予客户可靠、慎重、务实的法律建议，很好地平衡商业目标和法律风险。

电邮地址：rong.qin@sglaw.cn

Rong Qin

SG & CO PRC LAWYERS  |  Senior Legal Counsel

Prior to joining SG&CO., Ms. Rong Qin worked at the Shanghai office of an American law firm for 12 years, and was local partner of the Shanghai Office of another German law firm.Ms. Rong Qin is experienced in the areas of corporate law, cross-border merger and acquisition, foreign direct investment, and compliance. She represented numerous Fortune 500 U.S. companies in their investments and acquisitions in China, and assisted many Chinese companies in their outbound investment and offshore financing or investment transactions. Some of the clients she served include a renowned German luxury luggage brand, a major German auto part manufacturer, a German electricity transmission equipment manufacturer, and multiple Fortune 500 U.S. companies with industries spanning across chemicals, agriculture, insurance, machinery and electrical components, specialty materials, etc. Ms. Qin has accumulated solid practice experience from the past practice over a decade, understand local practice, and is able to keep up with the constantly changing regulatory environment and navigate highly ambiguous situations. She is strongly business minded, with good judgement, able to deliver thoughtful, prudent and business-oriented advice that appropriately balance business goal and legal risks.E-mail: rong.qin@sglaw.cn

曹发平

融孚律师事务所 律师

曹发平律师，复旦大学国际经济法法学硕士，2018年取得律师执业证；执业领域为私募基金、股权投融资和公司合规及争议解决。

曹律师主要为客户提供股权投融资法律服务，包括法律尽职调查、股权投资并购交易结构设计、私募基金管理人登记及产品备案方面的法律服务；此外，曹律师还为客户处理相关公司股权争议、债权债务以及不良资产处置等事项。

电邮地址：faping.cao@sglaw.cn

Faping Cao

SG & CO PRC LAWYERS  |  Lawyer

Lawyer Cao Faping holds a Master of Laws in International Economic Law from Fudan University and obtained his lawyer's license in 2018. His practice areas are private equity funds, equity investment and financing, corporate compliance and dispute resolution.

He mainly provides legal services in equity investment and financing legal services, including legal due diligence, equity investment M&A transaction structure design, private fund manager registration and fund product filing. In addition, he also handles issues related to corporate equity disputes, credit and debt, and disposal of non-performing assets for clients.

E-mail: faping.cao@sglaw.cn